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Steering the distribution of agents
in mean-field and cooperative games
Yongxin Chen, Tryphon Georgiou and Michele Pavon
Abstract
The purpose of this work is to pose and solve the problem to guide a collection of weakly interacting dynamical
systems (agents, particles, etc.) to a specified terminal distribution. The framework is that of mean-field and of
cooperative games. A terminal cost is used to accomplish the task; we establish that the map between terminal
costs and terminal probability distributions is onto. Our approach relies on and extends the theory of optimal mass
transport and its generalizations.
Keywords: Mean-field games, linear stochastic systems, weakly interacting particle system, McKean-Vlasov dy-
namics, optimal control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean-field game (MFG) theory is the study of noncooperative games involving a large number of agents. The
basic model requires agents to abide by identical dynamics and seek to minimize an individual cost function that
is also the same for all. As the number of agents increases to infinity, the empirical distribution of their states
becomes indifferent to the strategy of any single agent and yet it couples their individual responses. Thus, the
aggregate response of the agents (mean field) drives individual responses while the action of individual agents
is insignificant. On the flip side, cooperative games refer to the situation where agents seek to jointly optimize
a common performance index. Either way, the desire to minimize cost, individually or collectively, drives the
empirical distribution of agents in suitable ways. The purpose of this work to study for both, MFG and cooperative
games, the control problem to steer the collective response of agents over a finite window of time between two
specified end-point marginal distributions by suitable choice of cost (i.e., incentives) in non-cooperative games and
centralized control with cooperative agents, and also the problem to ensure a desired stationary distribution under
similar conditions. This viewpoint is influenced by optimal mass transport (OMT) theory that deals with the flow
of time-marginal densities for a collective (agents, particles, resources) and corresponding control and modeling
problems.
The study of MFG’s was introduced into the engineering literature by Huang, Malhame´ and Caines [1] and,
independently, by Lasry and Lions [2]. Earlier, in the economics literature, similar models were considered by
Jovanovic and Rosental [3]. The importance of the subject stems from the wide range of applications that include
modeling and control of multi-agent dynamical systems, stock market dynamics, crowd dynamics, power systems
and more; see [1], [2], [4], [5], and also see [6], [7], [8], [9] in the special case of linear dynamics and quadratic
cost. On the other hand, OMT originates in the work of Monge [10] and aims directly at relating/transporting
distributions under minimum cost. Kantorovich [11] introduced linear programming and duality theory for solving
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OMT resource allocation problems and, in recent years, a fast developing phase was spurred by a wide range
of applications of OMT to probability theory, economics, weather modeling, biology and mathematical physics
[12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. The connection between dynamic OMT [20] and stochastic control
has been explored in our work, e.g. [21], [22], where the focus has been on regulating stochastic uncertainty of
diffusion processes and of stochastically driven dynamical systems by suitable control action. These stochastic
control problems, in turn, relate to a classical maximum entropy problem on path space known as the Schro¨dinger
bridge problem, see e.g., [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28].
The goal of the present work is to study density steering problems in an MFG framework or, equivalently,
explore the role of interaction potential and decentralized strategies when steering an initial distribution to a terminal
one. In particular, we are interested on how to design an added terminal cost so as to provide incentives for
agents, under a Nash equilibrium strategy, to move collectively as specified. To this end, we establish that the map
between terminal costs and terminal probability distributions is onto. Thereby, we develop an MFG-based synthesis
framework for OMT-type stochastic control problems with or without stochastic excitation.
The paper evolves along the following lines. First, we discuss the motivation and problem formulation in Section
II. The solution is provided in Section III. In Section IV we study similar problems with less or no disturbance.
Section V is dedicated to the special case with Gaussian marginal distributions. Similar problems in the stationary
setting are investigated in Section VI. In Section VII, we developed the cooperative game counterpart of the density
steering problem. This follows by a simple academic example in Section VIII and a brief concluding remark in
Section IX.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We herein investigate the collective dynamical response of a group of agents (also thought of as particles,
players, and so on) that interact weakly with each other. The terminology “weakly” refers to the agents being sta-
tistically indistinguishable (anonymous) and affecting each other’s response only through their empirical distribution
[29]. Thus, we consider such a system of N agents with dynamics1 specified by
dxi(t) = Axi(t)dt+
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
A¯xj(t)dt+Bui(t)dt+Bdwi(t), (1)
xi(0) = x
i
0, i = 1, . . . , N.
Here, xi, ui, wi represent the state, control input, white noise disturbance, respectively, for the ith agent, and
the model parameters are the same for all. We further assume that their initial conditions x10, x
2
0, . . . , x
N
0 are all
independent with the same probability density ρ0. The ith agent interacts with the rest through the averaged position.
The matrices A, A¯ ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m are continuous functions of time; for notational simplicity we often use
e.g., A instead of A(t). It is assumed that the pair is controllable in the sense that the reachability Gramian
M(t, s) =
∫ t
s
Φ(t, τ)B(τ)B(τ)′Φ(t, τ)′dτ
is invertible for all s < t. Here, Φ(·, ·) denotes the state transition matrix that is defined via
∂Φ(t, s)
∂t
= AΦ(t, s), Φ(s, s) = I.
Clearly, in case when A is time-invariant, Φ(t, s) = eA(t−s).
In MFG [1], each agent searches for an optimal control strategy to minimize its own cost2
Ji(ui) = E
{∫ 1
0
f(t, xi(t), ui(t), µ
N (t))dt+ g(xi(1), µ
N (1))
}
, (2)
1This type of weakly coupled system of linear stochastic models has been studied in [6], [7], [8]. In our setting we further assume that
the noise dwi and control action u affect the dynamics in a similar manner, through the same matrix B. The more general case, where this
is not so, is more demanding and will be pursued in future publication, cf. [27], [28].
2For simplicity of notation and without loss in generality we take the end point to be t = 1.
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where
µN (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi(t) (3)
is the empirical distribution of the states of the N agents at time t. Thus, this is a non-cooperative game and the
cost of the ith agent is affected by the strategies of others only through the empirical distribution. An optimal
control corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for the game. We follow the arguments in [5], and restrict ourselves to
equilibria that correspond to symmetric Markovian control strategies (state feedback)
ui(t) = φ(t, xi(t)), i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
When N is large, the empirical distribution µN is indifferent to small perturbations of control strategy of a
single agent. This points to the following approach [5] to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium: fix a family
(µ(t))0≤t≤1 of probability measures and solve the standard stochastic control problem
φ? = argminφ E
{∫ 1
0
f(t, x(t), φ(t, x(t)), µ(t))dt+ g(x(1), µ(1))
}
(5)
subject to the dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯µ(t)dt+Bφ(t, x(t))dt+Bdw(t), x(0) = x0 a.s. (6)
where
x¯µ := 〈x, µ(t)〉
denotes the mean3 of the distribution µ(t), and x0 is a random vector with probability density ρ0. Considering
the choice (µ(t))0≤t≤1 as a parameter, the remaining issue is to choose this distribution flow so that the actual
distribution of the solution x(t) of (6) with optimal control strategy
u?(t) = φ?(t, x(t)) (7)
coincides with µ(t). The solution to the MFG problem involves establishing the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to two coupled partial differential equations (PDEs) [5]. It has been shown that a Nash equilibrium point
for this mean-field game exists under rather mild assumptions on the cost function [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
That is, there exists a family (µ(t))0≤t≤1 such that the distribution flow of the solution x(t) of (6) under optimal
control strategy φ? coincides with this same µ. In addition, this optimal control φ? is proven to be an ε-Nash
equilibrium to the N -player-game for N large [5], [30].
Departing from previous literature, this paper deals with the density steering problem of the N -player-game
system. More specifically, we are interested in introducting a suitable cost incentive so that the system is driven
to a specific distribution µ1 at time t = 1 under (7). In fact, it turns out that under mild conditions, a quadratic
running cost in both the control and state (i.e., group linear tracking as in the work of Huang, Malame´ and Caines
[1]), can be enhanced by a suitable terminal cost g as follows
Ji(ui) = E
{∫ 1
0
(
1
2
‖ui(t)‖2 + 1
2
‖xi(t)− x¯(t)‖2Q
)
dt+ g(xi(1), µ
N (1))
}
(8)
so as to acomplish the task of steering the initial distribution to the desired terminal one. In other words, we show
that the mapping between a choice of g and the terminal distribution µ1 is onto. Formally, the problem we are
interested in can be stated as follows.
Problem 1: Given N agents governed by (1) with initial probability density ρ0, find a terminal cost g such
that, in the Nash equilibrium with cost functional (8), the agents will reach a given terminal density ρ1 at time
t = 1, in the limit as N goes to ∞.
3Throughout, we use the expressions x¯µ or 〈x, µ(t)〉 interchangeably.
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III. GENERAL APPROACH AND SOLUTION
Without loss of generality and for simplicity of the exposition we only consider a running cost only in the
control actuation (i.e., taking the matrix Q in (8) to be zero). We begin by considering the optimal steering problem
[31], [27], [28], [32] without terminal cost, i.e., for a fixed density flow (µ(t))0≤t≤1, consider the control problem
to minimize
J(u) = E
{∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt
}
subject to the dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯µ(t)dt+Bu(t)dt+Bdw(t), x(0) = x0 ∼ ρ0 (9)
and the constraint that x(1) has probability density ρ1. This problem can be (formally) posed as
inf
ρ,u
∫ 1
0
∫
Rn
1
2
ρ(t, x)‖u(t, x)‖2dxdt, (10a)
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯µ +Bu)ρ)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ) = 0, (10b)
ρ(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ(1, ·) = ρ1. (10c)
Following a similar argument as in [22], we can establish the following sufficient condition for optimality.
Proposition 1: If there exists a function λ such that ρ?, λ satisfy
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯µ + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ = 0, (11a)
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯µ +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (11b)
and boundary conditions
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ?(1, ·) = ρ1, (11c)
then (ρ?, u? = B′∇λ) is a solution to (36).
Replacing µ in (11) by ρ? we obtain the system of (nonlinear) PDE’s
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ = 0, (12a)
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (12b)
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ?(1, ·) = ρ1. (12c)
We will show below that, under mild assumptions, (12) has a solution. In fact, we will construct such a solution
relying on standard Schro¨dinger bridge theory [21], [22].
Remark 2: Note that the coupled PDEs (12a-12b) are the same as the PDEs that arise in classic MFG problems
corresponding to (1) and (8). However, the usual boundary conditions
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, λ(1, x) = −g(x, ρ?(1, ·)),
are now different and given by (12c). Evidently, the Lagrange multiplier −λ is the value (cost-to-go) function of
the associated optimal control problem.
To solve (12), we first consider the Schro¨dinger bridge problem with prior dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+Bdw(t). (13)
Let
ρˆ0(x) = ρ0(x+ x¯ρ0)
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and
ρˆ1(x) = ρ1(x+ x¯ρ1),
then
〈x, ρˆ0〉 = 0, 〈x, ρˆ1〉 = 0.
The Schro¨dinger bridge with prior dynamics (13) and marginal distributions ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 is [21], [22]
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+BB′∇λˆ(t, x(t))dt+Bdw(t), (14)
where λˆ satisfies
∂λˆ
∂t
+∇λˆ ·Ax+ 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λˆ) + 1
2
∇λˆ ·BB′∇λˆ = 0, (15)
or, equivalently, ϕ = exp(λˆ) satisfies
∂ϕ
∂t
+∇ϕ ·Ax+ 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ϕ) = 0.
The boundary condition λˆ(1, ·) for λˆ is chosen in a way so that the resulting density flow ρˆ(t, x) of (14), which is
∂ρˆ
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+BB′∇λˆ)ρˆ)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρˆ) = 0,
matches the marginal distributions ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. The pair (λˆ, ρˆ) satisfies that
〈∇λˆ(t, ·), ρˆ(t, ·)〉 = 0 (16)
and therefore
〈x, ρˆ(t, ·)〉 = 0 (17)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. The intuition is that if the expectation of the control, i.e., 〈∇λˆ(t, ·), ρˆ(t, ·)〉, is not constantly 0,
then one can always shift the control by its mean to achieve a smaller cost. Now let
m(t) = Φ(1, t)′M¯−110 (x¯ρ1 − Φ¯10x¯ρ0),
y(t) the solution to
y˙(t) = (A+ A¯)y(t) +BB′m(t), y(0) = x¯ρ0 ,
and
γ(t) = −
∫ t
0
(A¯y(s) ·m(s) + 1
2
m(s) ·BB′m(s))ds.
Here Φ¯10 := Φ¯(1, 0) with Φ¯ being the state transition matrices for the pair (A+ A¯, B) and the “coupled” Gramian
M¯10 =
∫ 1
0
Φ¯(1, τ)BB′Φ(1, τ)′dτ
is assumed to be invertible. Note that y(1) = x¯ρ1 .
With these ingredients, we construct a solution to (12) as follows. Define (λ, ρ?) by
λ(t, x) = λˆ(t, x− y(t)) +m(t) · x+ γ(t), (18a)
and
ρ?(t, x) = ρˆ(t, x− y(t)). (18b)
In so doing, (λ, ρ?) is a solution of (12). On one hand, substituting (18) into (12b), in view of (17), we obtain
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?)
=
∂ρˆ
∂t
−∇ρˆ · ((A+ A¯)y +BB′m)
+∇ · ((Ax+BB′∇λ)ρˆ) + A¯〈ξ, ρˆ(t, ξ − y)〉 · ∇ρˆ− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρˆ)
= −∇ρˆ · (A¯y +BB′m) +∇ · (BB′mρˆ) + A¯〈ξ, ρˆ(t, ξ − y)〉 · ∇ρˆ = 0,
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where we referred to (17) in the last step. The fact that ρ? matches the boundary conditions (12c) follows directly
from the definition (18b). On the other hand, plugging (18) into (12a) yields
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ
=
∂λˆ
∂t
−∇λˆ · ((A+ A¯)y +BB′m) + m˙ · x+ γ˙
+ (∇λˆ+m) · (Ax+ A¯x¯ρ?) + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λˆ)
+
1
2
(∇λˆ+m) ·BB′(∇λˆ+m)
= −∇λˆ · A¯y + m˙ · x+ γ˙ + (∇λˆ+m) · A¯x¯ρ? +m ·Ax+ 1
2
m ·BB′m = 0.
Therefore (λ, ρ?) in (18) is indeed a solution to (12). Finally, back to Problem 1, we assert that with terminal cost
g(x, µ) = −λˆ(1, x− x¯µ)−m(1) · x− γ(1), (19)
we can lead the agents to have terminal distribution ρ1. To this extent, we follow the strategy in [5] as mentioned in
Section II. First fix µ = ρ? with ρ? as in (18b), and then solve the optimal control problem (5). Since g(x, ρ?(1, ·)) =
g(x, ρ1) = −λ(1, x), we have
E
{∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt+ g(x, ρ?(1, ·))
}
= E
{∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt− λ(1, x(1))
}
= E
{∫ 1
0
[
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt− dλ(t, x(t))]− λ(0, x(0))
}
= E
{∫ 1
0
[
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt− ∂λ
∂t
dt−∇λ · dx(t)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ)dt]− λ(0, x(0))
}
= E
{∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u(t)−B′∇λ(t, x(t))‖2dt
}
− E{λ(0, x(0)}.
Hence, the unique optimal control strategy is u?(t) = B′∇λ(t, x(t)). It follows from (12) that the probability
distribution of the controlled state x(t) is ρ?. Therefore, with terminal cost g as in (19) we are able to steer the
system to terminal distribution ρ1. Thus, we have established the following result.
Theorem 3: Consider N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ0. Suppose the terminal cost in (8) is as
in (19). Then, in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach density ρ1 at time t = 1, in the limit as N goes to ∞.
Remark 4: In fact, the dependence of g on µ is not necessary. One can simply take g(x, µ) = g(x) = −λ(1, x).
With this terminal cost, we can still conclude that (λ, ρ?) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium as well. This is due
to the fact that we fix the density flow first when we derive a Nash equilibrium. We might need the dependence of
g on µ to conclude the uniqueness of the equilibrium. It is unclear to us if this is the case.
IV. ZERO-NOISE LIMIT
In this section, we study the same problem (Problem 1), with however reduced disturbance. More specifically,
we consider a system of N agents with dynamics
dxi(t) = Axi(t)dt+
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
A¯xj(t)dt+Bui(t)dt+
√
Bdwi(t), (20)
xi(0) = x
i
0, i = 1, . . . , N,
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where  > 0 represents the variance of the noise. We are especially interested in the limit behavior of the solution
to Problem 1 with dynamics (20) when  goes to 0. Following the same arguments as in Section III, we arrive at
the coupled PDEs
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ = 0, (21a)
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (21b)
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ?(1, ·) = ρ1. (21c)
The optimal control strategy is given by u(t) = B′∇λ(t, x(t)) and terminal cost g is as in (19) with adjusted
diffusitivity.
Taking the limit of (21) as → 0 gives
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ = 0, (22a)
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?) = 0, (22b)
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ?(1, ·) = ρ1. (22c)
With similar analysis as in Section III we conclude that the above PDEs system has a (viscosity) solution [33]. In
particular, the solution (λ, ρ?) to (22) has the form (18) with λˆ being
λˆ(t, x) = inf
y
{
λˆ(0, y) +
1
2
(x− Φ(t, 0)y)′M(t, 0)−1(x− Φ(t, 0)y)
}
,
where
λˆ(0, x) = ψ(M
−1/2
10 Φ10x)−
1
2
x′Φ′10M
−1
10 Φ10x
and ψ corresponds to the optimal transport map with prior dynamics x˙ = Ax+Bu, and marginal distributions ρˆ0
and ρˆ1 after coordinate transformation, see [22, Proposition 2]. The solution to (22) in fact solves the following
problem.
Problem 5: Given N agents governed by (20) with  = 0, and initial probability density ρ0, find a function
g such that, in the Nash equilibrium with cost function (8), the agents would reach a specified density ρ1 at time
t = 1, in the limit as N goes to ∞.
With the solution to (22), we can choose a terminal cost as in (19). The corresponding equilibrium control strategy
is u(t, x) = B′∇λ(t, x).
Theorem 6: Consider N agents governed by (20) with  = 0 and initial density ρ0. Suppose the terminal cost
g in (8) is as in (19), then, in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach density ρ1 at time t = 1, in the limit as
N goes to ∞.
V. GAUSSIAN CASE
In the special case when ρ0 and ρ1 are normal (Gaussian) distributions, the solutions have a nice linear structure.
Let the two marginal distributions be
ρ0 ∼ N [m0,Σ0], ρ1 ∼ N [m1,Σ1],
i.e., Gaussian distributions with, respectively, means m0,m1 and covariances Σ0,Σ1. When  = 1, λˆ in (15) equals
λˆ(t, x) = −1
2
x′Π(t)x+
1
2
∫ t
0
tr(BB′Π(s))ds,
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where Π(t) is the solution to the Riccati equation
Π˙(t) = −A′Π(t)−Π(t)A+ Π(t)BB′Π(t) (23)
with boundary condition
Π(0) = Σ
−1/2
0
[
I
2
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0
−(I
4
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Σ1M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0 )
1/2
]
Σ
−1/2
0 .
where Φ10 = Φ(1, 0),M10 = M(1, 0). And so, in view of (19), one choice of terminal cost is
g(x, µ) =
1
2
(x− x¯µ)′Π(1)(x− x¯µ)−m(1) · x. (24)
In the above we have discarded some constant terms as it doesn’t affect the final result.
Theorem 7: Consider N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ0 ∼ N [m0,Σ0]. Suppose the terminal
cost in (8) is (24). Then, in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach density ρ1 ∼ N [m1,Σ1] at time t = 1, in
the limit as N goes to ∞.
Following the discussion in Section IV, the solution to the problem with noise intensity  is almost identical
to the above except that, the initial condition of the Riccati equation (23) becomes
Π(0) = Σ
−1/2
0
[
I
2
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0
−(
2I
4
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Σ1M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0 )
1/2
]
Σ
−1/2
0 .
Taking the limit as  → 0 we obtain the solution to the deterministic problem, which corresponds to the initial
condition
Π0(0) = Σ
−1/2
0
[
Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0
−(Σ1/20 Φ′10M−110 Σ1M−110 Φ10Σ1/20 )1/2
]
Σ
−1/2
0 .
VI. STATIONARY CASE AND INVARIANT MEASURE
We now turn to the stationary counterpart of the Problem 1. We would like to design a cost function that
will lead the the agents to achieve a given invariant measure ρ, if the agents follows the equilibrium strategy. In
particular, given N agents with identical dynamics (1) that attempt to minimize their control effort
Ji(ui) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
{∫ T
0
1
2
‖ui(t)‖2dt
}
,
we look for an extra cost g(x, µ) term added to the above such that, in the equilibrium state, the agents have some
specified distribution. The new cost function is
Ji(ui) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
{∫ T
0
[
1
2
‖ui(t)‖2 + g(xi(t), µN (t))]dt
}
(25)
where µN is the empirical distribution (3). Again we are interested in the mean-field limit of the problem, that is,
the case when N goes to ∞.
Let’s first recall some relevant results in the stationary mean-field game problems. Suppose the N agents with
dynamics (1) attempt to minimize the cost function
Ji(ui) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
{∫ T
0
f(xi(t), ui(t), µ
N (t))dt
}
.
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We restrict ourself to equilibriums with symmetric stationary Markovian strategies
ui(t) = φ(xi(t)).
In the mean-field limit, one can adapt the following steps [5]. First, fix a probability measure µ and then solve the
standard stochastic control problem (parametrized by µ)
φ? = argminφ lim
T→∞
1
T
E
{∫ T
0
f(x(t), φ(x(t)), µ(t))dt
}
(26)
subject to the dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯µdt+Bφ(x(t))dt+Bdw(t). (27)
Once this standard optimal control problem is solved, the remaining issue is finding the correct distribution µ such
that the stationary distribution of (27) with optimal control strategy
u?(t) = φ?(x(t))
coincides with µ. The solution to this mean-field game problem involves the coupled PDEs [2], [5]
1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + η −Hρ?(x,−∇λ) = 0, (28a)
∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +Bφ?)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (28b)
ρ? ≥ 0,
∫
ρ? = 1, (28c)
where η is a constant, u? = φ?(x) is the minimizer of
Hρ(x, p) = min
u∈Rm
{
p′(Ax+ A¯x¯ρ +Bu) + f(x, u, ρ)
}
.
When the cost function is of the form (25), the PDEs boil down to
1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + η +∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ− g(x, ρ?) = 0, (29a)
∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (29b)
ρ? ≥ 0,
∫
ρ? = 1. (29c)
The existence of a solution (ρ?, λ) can be shown under some proper assumptions on g, see [2], [5].
Back to our problem, the cost function g in (25) becomes a design parameter, which is different from the
classic MFG setting. Our goal is to choose a function g such that the corresponding stationary distribution in Nash
equilibrium is ρ?. The solution relies on the same PDEs (29), but with different variables. Given a distribution ρ?,
we need to find λ and the proper cost g that solve (29). It turns out that (29) has solution only for a small class
of distributions ρ?, which we call the feasible distributions. We next focus on Gaussian distributions. In this case,
the feasible distributions can be characterized by some algebraic equations. The cases of general distributions will
be investigated in future study.
Let ρ? be a Gaussian distribution with mean m and covariance Σ. Plugging the ansatz
λ(x) = −1
2
x′Πx+ n′x
with Π = Π′, into (29) yields (after discarding constant terms)
−1
2
tr(BB′Π) + η +
1
2
x′(−ΠA−A′Π + ΠBB′Π)x (30a)
+n′(A−BB′Π)x−m′A¯′Πx− g(x, ρ?) = 0
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(A−BB′Π)Σ + Σ(A−BB′Π)′ +BB′ = 0 (30b)
(A+ A¯−BB′Π)m+BB′n = 0. (30c)
In order for the solution to exist, in view of (30b), it is necessary that Σ satisfies
AΣ + ΣA′ ∈ range(fB), (31a)
where fB(X) = BX ′+XB′ is a map from Rn×m to the space of symmetric matrices (see [28] for other equivalent
algebraic conditions). Likewise, by (30c), the mean m has to satisfy
(A+ A¯)m ∈ range(B). (31b)
On the other hand, given (m,Σ) satisfying (31), assuming B has full column rank, then (30b) has a unique
symmetric solution [28]. Therefore, these two conditions are also sufficient. Now from (30a) it is easy to conclude
that a possible cost function is
g(x, ρ) =
1
2
x′Qx+ n · (A−BB′Π)x− x¯ρ · A¯′Πx, (32a)
with
Q = −ΠA−A′Π + ΠBB′Π, (32b)
with Π being the unique solution to (30b). Therefore, we have established the following result.
Theorem 8: Consider N agents governed by (1). Suppose the g function in the cost (25) is as in (32), then,
in the Nash equilibrium, the agents will reach stationary Gaussian distribution with mean m and covariance Σ, in
the limit as N goes to ∞.
VII. COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section we shift to a slightly different problem. Given the same interacting agents’ system (1), we
would like to investigate the density steering problem in the cooperative game setting. How to select an optimal
controller to drive the agents from given initial distribution ρ0 to terminal distribution ρ1? Again, we restrict ourself
to equilibriums given by symmetric Markovian strategies in closed-loop feedback form
ui(t) = φ(t, xi(t)), i = 1, . . . , N. (33)
The cost function we attempt to minimize is the average control energy
J(u) = E
{
N∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖ui(t)‖2dt
}
. (34)
We are interested in the mean-field limit, namely, the asymptotical behavior of the solution when N →∞.
Problem 9: Given N agents governed by (1) with initial density ρ0, find a control strategy (33) with minimum
control energy (34) so that the agents will reach density ρ1 at time t = 1, as N goes to ∞.
The major difference between this problem and the mean-field game is that all the agents always use the same
control strategy. A small perturbation on the control will affect the probability density flow as the perturbation is
applied to the controllers of all the agents, see [5], [34] for more discussions on their differences. The average
control energy (34) is equivalent to relative entropy of the controller system with respect to the uncontrolled system
[35], [36], [29]. Therefore, the above problem can also be viewed as an Schro¨dinger bridge problem for interacting
particle systems.
Problem 9 can be formulated as an optimal control problem over the McKean-Vlasov model
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯(t)dt+Bu(t)dt+Bdw(t), x(0) = x0 ∼ ρ0. (35)
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It has the following fluid dynamic formulation. Let ρ(t, ·) be the probability density of the controlled process x(t),
then the optimal control problem can be stated as
inf
ρ,u
∫ 1
0
∫
Rn
1
2
ρ(t, x)‖u(t, x)‖2dxdt, (36a)
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ +Bu)ρ)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ) = 0, (36b)
ρ(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ(1, ·) = ρ1. (36c)
Proposition 2: If there exists (λ, ρ?) satisfying
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ+ A¯x · 〈∇λ, ρ?〉 = 0, (37a)
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?) = 0, (37b)
with boundary conditions
ρ?(0, ·) = ρ0, ρ?(1, ·) = ρ1, (37c)
then (ρ?, u? = B′∇λ) is a solution to (36).
Equations (37) are highly coupled. In general, one may not expect a solution to exist. But interestingly, as
we will see below, (37) always has a solution. In fact, we are going to construct a solution based on standard
Schro¨dinger bridge theory.
Let (ρˆ, λˆ) be as in (13)-(16),
m(t) = Φ¯(1, t)′Mˆ−110 (x¯ρ1 − Φ¯10x¯ρ0) (38a)
and y(t) the solution to
y˙(t) = (A+ A¯)y(t) +BB′m(t), y(0) = x¯ρ0 , (38b)
where Mˆ10 = Mˆ(1, 0) with
Mˆ(t, s) =
∫ t
s
Φ¯(t, τ)BB′Φ¯(t, τ)′dτ.
Define
γ(t) = −
∫ t
0
(A¯y(s) ·m(s) + 1
2
m(s) ·BB′m(s))ds,
λ(t, x) = λˆ(t, x− y(t)) +m(t) · x+ γ(t), (39a)
and
ρ?(t, x) = ρˆ(t, x− y(t)), (39b)
then (λ, ρ?) solves (37). Apparently, (39b) satisfies the boundary conditions (37c). To verify (37b), substitute (39)
into (37b), which gives
∂ρ?
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+ A¯x¯ρ? +BB′∇λ)ρ?)− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρ?)
=
∂ρˆ
∂t
−∇ρˆ · ((A+ A¯)y +BB′m) +∇ · ((Ax+BB′∇λ)ρˆ)
+ A¯〈ξ, ρˆ(ξ − y)〉 · ∇ρˆ− 1
2
tr(BB′∇2ρˆ)
= −∇ρˆ · (A¯y +BB′m) +∇ · (BB′mρˆ) + A¯〈ξ, ρˆ(ξ − y)〉 · ∇ρˆ = 0.
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Similarly, Combing (39) and (37a) yields
∂λ
∂t
+∇λ ·Ax+∇λ · A¯x¯ρ? + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λ) + 1
2
∇λ ·BB′∇λ+ A¯x · 〈∇λ, ρ?〉
=
∂λˆ
∂t
−∇λˆ · ((A+ A¯)y +BB′m)
+ m˙ · x+ γ˙ + (∇λˆ+m) · (Ax+ A¯x¯ρ?) + 1
2
tr(BB′∇2λˆ)
+
1
2
(∇λˆ+m) ·BB′(∇λˆ+m) + A¯x · 〈∇λˆ+m, ρ?〉
= −∇λˆ · A¯y + m˙ · x+ γ˙ + (∇λˆ+m) · A¯x¯ρ?
+m ·Ax+ 1
2
m ·BB′m+ A¯x ·m+ A¯x · 〈∇λˆ, ρ?〉
= A¯x · 〈∇λˆ(ξ − y), ρˆ(ξ − y)〉 = 0.
Therefore, the pair (ρ?, u? = B′∇λ) is indeed a solution to (37). Next we prove that this pair (ρ?, u?) provides a
solution to the optimal control problem (36).
Let u¯(t) = E{u(t)}, then, by (35), we have
dx¯(t) = (A+ A¯)x¯(t)dt+Bu¯(t)dt (40)
and
d(x˜(t)) = Ax˜(t)dt+Bu˜(t)dt+Bdw, (41)
where x˜ = x− x¯ and u˜ = u− u¯. The control energy can then be decomposed into two parts as
E{
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u(t)‖2dt} =
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u¯(t)‖2dt+ E{
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u˜(t)‖2dt}.
These two parts of control energy, corresponding to u¯ and u − u¯ respectively, can be minimized independently
since the dynamics (40) and (41) are decoupled. We next show that
i) u¯? minimizes ∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u¯(t)‖2dt (42)
ii) u˜? minimizes
E{
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u˜(t)‖2dt}. (43)
For i), recalling
u?(t) = B′∇λ = B′∇λˆ(t, x(t)− y(t)) +B′m(t),
we have
u¯?(t) = B′E{∇λˆ(t, x(t)− y(t))}+B′m(t)
= B′〈∇λˆ(t, x− y(t)), ρ?(t, x)〉+B′m(t) = B′m(t).
Using standard optimal control, it is easy to see that u¯?(t) minimizes (42) subject to (40) and boundary conditions
x¯(0) = x¯ρ0 , x¯(1) = x¯ρ1 .
We next show ii). Note
u˜?(t) = B′∇λˆ(t, x(t)− y(t)) = B′∇λˆ(t, x(t)− x¯(t)) = B′∇λˆ(t, x˜(t)).
By Schro¨dinger bridge theory [21], [22] (see also (14)-(15)), it minimizes
E{
∫ 1
0
1
2
‖u˜(t)‖2dt}
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subject to
dx˜(t) = Ax˜(t)dt+Bu˜(t)dt+Bdw
and marginal distributions of x˜(0) and x˜(1), which are ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, respectively. Hence we have established the
following result.
Theorem 10: The pair (ρ?, u? = B′∇λ) with ρ?, λ as in (39) solves (36).
A. Linear-Quadratic case
When both of the marginals ρ0 and ρ1 are normal distributions, the optimal control u? is a linear state-feedback
control. Let the two marginal distributions ρ0 and ρ1 be
ρ0 ∼ N [m0,Σ0], ρ1 ∼ N [m1,Σ1].
By Theorem 10, we need only to compute λ as in (39a), which is
λ(t, x) = λˆ(t, x− y(t)) +m(t) · x+ γ(t).
The function λˆ corresponds to the Schro¨dinger bridge (14), which satisfies [27]
∇λˆ(t, x) = −Π(t)x,
where Π(t) is the solution to the Riccati equation
Π˙(t) = −A′Π(t)−Π(t)A+ Π(t)BB′Π(t)
with boundary condition
Π(0) = Σ
−1/2
0 [
I
2
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0
− (I
4
+ Σ
1/2
0 Φ
′
10M
−1
10 Σ1M
−1
10 Φ10Σ
1/2
0 )
1/2]Σ
−1/2
0 .
It follows the optimal control is
u?(t) = B′∇λ(t, x(t)) = −B′Π(t)(x(t)− y(t)) +B′m(t) = −B′Π(t)x(t) +B′n(t),
where
n(t) = Π(t)y(t) +m(t)
= Π(t)Φ¯(t, 1)Mˆ(1, t)Mˆ−110 Φ¯10m0
+ Π(t)Mˆ(t, 0)Φ¯(1, t)′Mˆ−110 m1 + Φ¯(1, t)
′Mˆ−110 (m1 − Φ¯10m0).
B. Zero-noise limit
We study the optimal steering problem for McKean-Vlasov model (35) with smaller disturbance
√
dw(t),
namely,
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯(t)dt+Bu(t)dt+
√
Bdw(t), x(0) = x0 a.s.. (44)
In particular, we are interested in the zero-noise limit of this problem. That is, optimal steering problem for dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+ A¯x¯(t)dt+Bu(t)dt, x(0) = x0 a.s.. (45)
We show that the probability flow of the solution to the latter is the limit of that of the former as  goes to 0. This
is achieved in a constructive manner.
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Let’s start with the steering problem for the dynamics
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+Bu(t)dt
with marginals ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. This problem has been studied in [22] and the solution is
u˜(t, x) = B′Φ(1, t)′M−110 (T ◦ T−1t (x)− Φ10(T−1t (x))) (46)
where T is the generalized optimal mass transport map [22] with marginals ρˆ0, ρˆ1, and
Tt(x) = Φ(t, 1)M(1, t)M
−1
10 Φ10x+M(t, 0)Φ(1, t)
′M−110 T (x).
The corresponding distribution flow is
ρˆ(t, ·) = (Tt)]ρˆ0.
Note that ρˆ and u˜ satisfy the continuity equation
∂ρˆ
∂t
+∇ · ((Ax+Bu˜)ρˆ) = 0.
We claim that
u?(t, x) = u˜(t, x− y(t)) +B′m(t) (47)
with y,m in (38), is the optimal control strategy for the steering problem for the dynamics (45) and the corresponding
distribution flow is
ρ?(t, x) = ρˆ(t, x− y(t)). (48)
We shall skip the proof as it is similar to the case with disturbance (see (39)-(43)).
The solution to the density steering problem with dynamics (44), weakly converges to ρ? as  goes to 0. This
follows directly from the fact a Schro¨dinger bridge converges to the corresponding optimal transport solution [22]
as  goes to 0.
VIII. EXAMPLES
Consider N agents with dynamics
dxi(t) = xi(t)dt− 2
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
xj(t)dt+ dwi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The two marginal distributions ρ0 and ρ1 are two normal distributions
ρ0 ∼ N [1, 4], ρ1 ∼ N [−4, 1].
A. Noncooperative game
One choice of terminal cost that will steer the agents from ρ0 to ρ1 is
g(x, µ) = 0.9805(x− x¯µ)2 + 4.3679x.
Figure 1 showcases the evolution of the probability density in the Nash equilibrium. To show that the distribution
of the agents would evolve according to Figure 1, we simulated the dynamics for a system with N = 20000 agents
under the optimal strategy. Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the empirical distributions of the particles at time t = 0
and t = 1. They match with the theoretical distributions ρ0 and ρ1 very well. We also show the empirical mean of
these particles in Figure 4, which perfectly matches the theoretical result.
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Fig. 1: Time evolution of probability densities
Fig. 2: Empirical distribution of x(0)
B. Cooperative game
Figure 5 depicts the time evolution of the probability densities with these two marginal distributions in the
cooperative game setting. Similarly, we ran some simulations for a particle system with N = 20000 and obtained
Figure 6 and Figure 7 as the empirical distributions of the agents at time t = 0 and t = 1. We also show the empirical
mean of these particles in Figure 8. Clearly the mean is different to the Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative
game setting.
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Fig. 3: Empirical distribution of x(1)
Fig. 4: Time evolution of mean x¯(t)
IX. CONCLUSION
We introduce a paradigm to steer a large number of agents from one distribution to another. The problem lies
in the intersection of MFG, OMT and optimal control. We study such problems for linearly weakly interacting
agents and solve the problem using tools from all these three areas. Results for several extensions such as stationary
and cooperative game problems are also presented. We expect this paradigm to bring in a new dimension to the
study and applications of MFG and OMT.
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Fig. 5: Time evolution of probability densities
Fig. 6: Empirical distribution of x(0)
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